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Business History and Economic Globalisation  
Recent reviewers of the current state and future direction of business history have 
complained that, despite the growth of business history as a distinct academic 
discipline in recent decades, the field has tended to become side-lined in a 
number of debates which traditionally have been of major concern to business 
and economic historians. The paper discusses this issue by focusing on one of the 
major fields of research among economic historians and social scientists in recent 
years, namely the history of economic globalisation, and specifically the 
spectacular growth in international trade characterising the process. The history 
of economic globalisation and the causes of international trade growth has been a 
flourishing field of research in recent years, but business historians have not 
managed to make their mark on the major debates. We argue that one way of 
altering this situation would be to reinvigorate the old established link between 
business history and maritime history. We present two case studies showing how 
maritime firms played essential roles in putting in place vital organisational, 
technological and institutional preconditions for international trade growth. On 
this basis we argue that business historians of maritime firms are uniquely placed 
to understand the inner workings of the economic globalisation process and 
provide explanatory content to the macro oriented analysis dominating the 
existing literature.  
 
Keywords: economic globalisation, international shipping, trade, car transport, 
pure car carriers, chemicals, parcel tankers,  
 
Introduction 
Recent reviewers of the current state and future direction of business history have 
complained that, despite the growth of business history as a distinct academic 
discipline, the field has tended to become side-lined in a number of debates which 
traditionally have been of major concern to economic historians. When the Oxford 
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Handbook of Business History was launched in 2007, one of the main reasons for 
publishing the book was the need to ‘liberate’ a research field that ‘is often 
overlooked’.1  In several of the book’s chapters, this perceived side-lining of business 
historians was noted.2 Similar complaints have also been made elsewhere. In 2006, 
Geoffrey Jones and Tarun Khanna posed the need to bring ‘history [back] into 
international business’ since, [..] systematic investigation of historical evidence has 
disappeared from the research agenda of most IB scholars’.3 In their editorial for the 
2011 spring issue of Business History Review, Geoffrey Jones and his Harvard 
colleague Walter Friedman similarly noted how, ‘although entrepreneurship is an area 
in which business historians have made important contributions, [..] most of the recent 
conceptual work has been done by economist and management scholars.’4 The purpose 
of this article is to analyse this perceived absence of business history from the major 
general debates on-going within the social sciences and among economic historians, to 
discuss some of the reasons for this absence and how it can be resolved.  
In dealing with these issues we take as our point of departure the history of 
economic globalisation. We are specifically concerned with the spectacular growth in 
international trade characteristic of the last two centuries and how business historians 
can contribute to a better understanding of this process. The history of economic 
globalisation has been a flourishing field of research among economic historians and 
social scientists in recent years, but business historians have not managed to make their 
mark in the major debates. As noted by Friedman and Jones in their 2011 editorial, 
‘business historians have dominated the efforts to show that there is nothing new about 
the globalization of firms [but], in recent years business historians have often been 
fringe players in the study of globalization, while political historians, economists, 
sociologists and political scientists have taken it forward in exiting ways.’5 Even among 
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general economic historians, the role of firms in the globalization process has been 
largely ignored. This situation is regrettable, since, we will argue, business historians 
are uniquely placed to understand the inner workings of the globalisation process. 
Although the ebb and flow of the economic globalisation process and its main 
determinants may perhaps be most effectively derived from macro level analysis, 
business history can provide an important and necessary supplement.   
To succeed in this task, however, business historians need to be more able and 
willing to shuttle between various levels of analysis. The micro and meso analyses 
conducted at the firm and /or at the industry level need to be informed by existing 
knowledge developed at the macro level, and they need to be developed in a way that 
makes it possible to supplement and challenge existing explanations derived from 
macro level analysis. In a 1983 special issue of Business History Review, British 
economic historian Leslie Hannah complained how British business history had been 
too focused on singular company histories while ‘systematic integrative work [..] 
dealing with wider themes, ... [had] been halting’. This claim is to a large extent still 
valid.6 There is still a need to insist on the importance of including business firms when 
analysing larger processes of economic change, and at the same time to stimulate 
business historians to relate their studies of business enterprises to such larger 
processes.  
Understanding economic globalisation and the historic development of 
international trade also requires increased focus on sectors of the economy that have 
attracted only limited attention from business historians in recent decades. One of the 
most obvious and promising fields of research in this respect, we argue, is the transport 
sector, and particularly maritime transport. It is well recognised that seaborne transport 
was a fundamental feature in the growth of the international economy during the 
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nineteenth and twentieth century. In spite of this fact, and of the early intellectual 
linkages between maritime and business history – personified by professor Francis 
Hyde, the renowned maritime historian and founder of the journal Business History –, 
historians concerned with the issue of globalisation have not been very interested in 
maritime enterprises.  Business histories of shipping firms abound, but few have made 
any explicit references to the general debates about globalisation and the role of 
shipping firms in cross-border economic integration. We are confident, however, that 
much is to be gained by realigning maritime history and research on globalisation. By 
studying the operations of shipping firms we are provided with a privileged access to 
the workplace where important physical aspects of economic globalisation was 
organised. 
The article starts with a brief review of the existing literature on economic 
globalisation, focusing on what has been written on international trade growth and the 
worldwide integration of markets for goods. We subsequently present the case for a 
revived relationship between business and maritime historians, and why it may provide 
a promising avenue for improved understanding of nineteenth and twentieth century 
trade growth. The second section of the article presents case studies of two enterprises 
involved in innovation of maritime transport – the Norwegian shipping firms Ugland 
and Odfjell, operating within the car carrying and chemical trade respectively. The 
business operations of these shipowners show how even small firms situated in the 
outskirts of Northern Europe participated in creating the necessary preconditions for 
increased overseas trade and globalisation.  
Business history, maritime history and economic globalisation  
Globalisation as a phenomenon seriously caught the interest of social scientists and 
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historians from the mid-1990s onwards.7 Since then a plethora of work has appeared, 
pointing in many different directions. Historical research on the economic aspect of the 
globalisation process has centred on the questions of when it actually began and to what 
extent the globalisation of the post-World War II period is to be regarded as something 
historically new.8 This body of work has considerably improved our understanding of 
how economic globalisation has evolved historically. It has pointed out important 
historical precedents of the contemporary globalisation process, and informed current 
debates on the extent, causes and consequences of increased international economic 
integration. It has also shown how globalisation is not an inevitable process, but relies 
both on technological preconditions and on the political will to pursue a more open and 
integrated economic society.9  
The bulk of this research, however, has not been conducted by mainstream 
historians.10 Methodologically it has been characterised by quantitative analysis of large 
data sets, focusing on trends in the globalisation experience that can be gauged and 
analysed by statistical measures.11 Explanations typically rest on some form of 
simplified model and are evaluated on the basis of the data at hand. In terms of 
understanding growth (or decline) in international trade, for example, the standard 
framework suggests that the level of international trade at any given time is, simply put, 
decided by the cost of moving goods between markets. These trade costs are of two 
major types: costs due to transport and costs due to politically enforced trade barriers. 
To explain trade growth on this basis, one only has to look at the parallel movements in 
the price of transport and the politically induced ‘price’ of imports. In periods when the 
price of transport falls more than tariffs and other politically induced trade barriers, 
technological change ‘explains’ most of the observed trade growth. In periods where 
tariff levels show the fastest and most substantial decrease, politics is regarded as the 
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most important explanation. The argument presented by Ronald Findlay and Kevin 
O’Rourke in their acclaimed study of the history of international trade, Power and 
plenty, is characteristic of this type of reasoning:  
If we have dwelt at length on the political influences on international commodity market 
integration following the end of World War II, this is because these were the dominant 
influences shaping post-1945 patterns of integration and disintegration worldwide. This is 
the major distinction between the globalizations of the late nineteenth and late twentieth 
centuries: as we have seen, the former was overwhelmingly technological in origin, with 
falling transportation costs driving commodity markets closer together, despite the best 
efforts of many politicians to keep them apart by imposing countervailing tariffs.  The latter 
was much more political in origin, and involved artificial trade barriers which had arisen as 
a result of two world wars and the Great depression being gradually dismantled. For despite 
the revolutionary technological advances of the period, the cost of transporting goods across 
the oceans of the world fell in real terms surprisingly little.’12 
 
Although this type of analysis offers important insights, its logical rigor comes at the 
cost of oversimplification. It may also lead to biased conclusions. Although the cost of 
trade will ultimately decide whether trade in a given product makes economic sense, 
price reductions result from complex organisational, technological and institutional 
preconditions that cannot simply be presumed. In addition, expanding trade relies on a 
number of factors that do not necessarily affect the cost of trade, as reflected in freight 
rates. Existing studies of international trade growth and globalisation tend to overlook 
these issues. Often, this neglect is deliberate. In their study of economic globalisation in 
a historical perspective Michael Bordo and his colleagues openly admit that they 
‘exclude much that [..] matters’, including such aspects as ‘the transmission of 
technology’. The reason is that they ‘simply think that, as economists, we are better 
equipped to resolve the other issues first’.13 For business historians, the situation is 
different. It is precisely by putting these neglected preconditions for international trade 
growth at centre stage that business historians can make their most important 
contribution to the globalisation debate. They can do so by investigating the various 
9 
 
actors, firms and institutions involved in building the preconditions for trade, exploring 
how they went about  developing their business, what challenges they faced  and how 
these challenges were confronted.  This will provide a necessary supplement to the 
economists’ analysis and may also prepare the ground for essential revisions of existing 
interpretations.  
To some extent, this work has already started.  As Geoffrey Jones recently 
noted, recent studies made by business historians have ‘highlighted the importance of 
entrepreneurs and firms, rather than markets and technologies, in the history of 
globalisation [and] shown that business enterprises have not simply responded to global 
markets, but have often created them.’14  In this way business historians have already 
provided valuable insights into the history of economic globalisation. But this has 
mostly happened indirectly. The business historical literature related to globalisation 
still remains quite firm-specific and explicit links between the strategic and commercial 
development of a given firm and globalisation are seldom made. It is also evident, as 
Jones admits, that ‘much of the research has taken the nation state as the starting point’, 
and primarily analysed the development of firms within a ‘national framework’.15 
Therefore, while business historians have analysed many aspects relevant to the 
understanding of the globalisation process, they have not managed to make an impact 
on the on-going debates about globalisation.   
This situation is regrettable. As indicated above we believe that a possible way 
of improvement would be to reinvigorate the old established link between business 
history and maritime history. By its very nature, maritime history transcends the nation-
specific approach dominating much existing business historical research: ‘Maritime 
history is international by nature and global by coverage,’ writes the renowned maritime 
historian Gelina Harlaftis; ‘it can hardly be written without crossing borders and seas, 
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without dealing constantly with maritime links between different continents, economies 
and cultures.’16 Studying maritime firms involved in transporting goods across the globe 
simply necessitates a transnational rather than a nation-centred approach. Moreover, 
studying the operations of shipping firms provides a unique perspective from which to 
examine how fundamental preconditions for the economic globalisation process were 
actually put in place. More than 90 per cent of the volume of international trade is still 
transported by ships, according to the International Maritime Organization (IMO). 17  In 
order to understand the inner workings of international trade growth – or, to cite Leslie 
Hannah, its ‘microeconomic roost’ – we believe a good place to start would be to study 
the firms owning, operating and developing these ships.18 
How has the maritime sector effected the growth in trade during the second half 
of the twentieth century? To investigate this question the existing literature has focused 
on developments in the cost of seaborne transport and whether these costs have declined 
or increased in real terms. The general conclusion has been that the developments in the 
shipping industry were not important factors in explaining international trade growth 
during this period, since ocean freights apparently did not decline much in real terms.19 
While this conclusion is in itself questionable the main point to be made here is simply 
that the role of the shipping industry in the growth of international trade cannot be 
evaluated on the basis of price developments alone.20 As already noted, price 
developments rest on a number of preconditions that need to be analysed and 
understood. Moreover, qualitative preconditions that do not necessarily affect the cost 
of trade also need to be investigated and explained. Between 1960 and 1990 alone, the 
volume of world trade carried by ships increased six-fold.21  Irrespective of any price 
development, this massive trade growth could not have been accomplished without 
groundbreaking technological, organisational and institutional transformations in the 
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existing transport system. The total volume of shipping room had to be drastically 
enlarged. For some products, completely new types of ships had to be envisaged and 
developed. In addition to actual shipping room, land based facilities had to be improved 
to secure the efficient operation of the new and enlarged ships. This implied the 
construction of larger and deeper ports, the building of berths with loading and 
unloading facilities, the construction of specialised onshore storage installations and the 
development of efficient land based transport solutions capable of serving the new ports 
at a pace and a scale congruent with the capacity of the new ships. In addition, 
institutional changes such as the increasing use of flags of convenience were introduced 
to cut costs. New arrangements for financing the building of increasingly large, 
increasingly sophisticated (and hence increasingly expensive) vessels also had to be 
developed. Finally, the development also rested on ground-breaking innovations in the 
organisation of shipping companies. The traditional, large, integrated shipping firms 
increasingly sought to outsource several of the operations that had traditionally been a 
natural part of their day to day activities, eventually causing a ‘decomposition of the 
value chain’ within the shipping industry as a whole.22  
None of these transformations happened by themselves. Rather, they were the 
result of deliberate commercial strategies implemented by actual businesses seeking to 
gain an economic advantage. Shipping firms and shipping entrepreneurs often stood at 
the centre of these processes.  They took the initiative to build new and larger ships and 
they envisaged and developed new transport technologies that enabled more efficient 
transport of both familiar and new products. They were also often responsible for the 
numerous organisational innovations and institutional changes which built the 
foundations for increased international trade. Finally, they often played an active role in 
linking the various producers, transporters, financiers, shipbuilders and costumers in 
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different countries who had to be coordinated in order for the seaborne carrying 
capacity to expand as fast as it did and for the new, drastically enlarged transport system 
to function efficiently.   
A historical explanation of economic globalisation should include analysis and 
narratives of why and how these commercial strategies were developed and executed. In 
solving this task, business historians are uniquely placed to offer important and new 
insights. Two examples – one from the history of the trade in cars and large machinery, 
another from the trade in chemical products – may serve as an illustration of the 
possible contributions from this kind of business history.  
 
Facilitating international trade: The case of cars and chemicals 
From the mid-1950s to the mid-1990s international trade in large machinery, transport 
equipment and cars increased substantially. The value of total car exports increased 
more than hundredfold. From being a negligible part of international trade, within forty 
years cars became the fourth largest export item in the world. Machinery and transport 
equipment saw a similar growth, and by 1995 this category had become the largest 
export item in world trade in terms of value.23 In volume terms the expansion was also 
considerable. As an example, the total number of cars exported passed two million in 
1960. By 1995 the annual figure had risen to nineteen million, and ten years later it 
exceeded twenty-seven million.24 About half of these cars were sent overseas. The 
volume of large machinery and transport equipment carried over the oceans grew at an 
equal rate. 
The growth of trade in cars and heavy machinery, intensifying from the 1970s 
onwards, was a typical reflection of the accelerated globalisation process characterising 
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the last quarter of the twentieth century, or the ‘re-globalization’ of the world economy 
as it has been termed.25  A deeper and detailed understanding of how the growth of this 
trade came about would therefore significantly improve our understanding of 
globalisation in general.  
Much has been written about the growth of the international car manufacturing 
industry and a wealth of data has been gathered on the fluctuating growth pattern, the 
scale, the geographical shifts and the economic consequences of the international car 
trade.26 But very little work has been done on the preconditions for the growth of car 
export and the fundamental role played by maritime transport in creating and sustaining 
it. Throughout the period covered here, about half of the world’s total car export was 
transported by sea. The fastest growing car exporter in the world for most of the period, 
Japan, was fully reliant on seaborne means of transport. Japanese car exporters could 
simply not have reached the scale they did so quickly or competed so successfully with 
other countries’ car manufacturers had it not been for parallel, groundbreaking 
technological and organisational improvements in the seaborne transport of cars. 
European exports of cars across the North Atlantic to North America also grew 
substantially from the 1960s onwards, first dominated by Volkswagen and later joined 
by producers such as Swedish Volvo and Italian Fiat. From the 1970s onwards US 
overseas exports also started to gain serious momentum. To understand the increasing 
growth in international car trade – and hence globalisation – we need to explore how the 
preconditions for this trade were put in place. How was the massive trade in cars made 
possible? Which were the firms involved in organising the car trade? What motivated 
their participation and what capabilities and commercial strategies did they draw on to 
be able to expand and operate their fleet of ocean going car carriers as fast and 
efficiently as they did? 
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When the car trade started to expand seriously in the early 1960s, existing ships 
were not able to transport cars efficiently and safely across long overseas distances, and 
ports had not been constructed to handle the rapidly growing number of vehicles 
passing through their facilities. Competence among shipowners and shipbrokers for 
handling cars was negligible. Before 1950, they had typically been transported 
unassembled, in crates, and carried by conventional liners. For the car trade to expand 
as fast as it did during the second half of the twentieth century a series of innovations in 
seaborne car carrying was necessary. During this process, firms of various nationalities 
and operating at various levels of the value chain were engaged in developing new and 
innovative ship designs and in solving the numerous logistical and other challenges that 
impeded efficient and safe overseas transport of cars. Shipowners often stood at the 
centre of these processes, weaving a transnational web of car manufacturers, car 
importers, shipyards, handling agents, port authorities and shipbrokers that had to pull 
together in order for the expansion of the car trade to function smoothly and efficiently.  
One example is the expansion in the exports of Italian Fiats from the early 1970s 
onwards. As already noted, during the 1960s the West German Volkswagen group had 
dominated world trade in cars. In 1965, the company accounted for almost half of the 
world’s total car exports and about two thirds of the entire European exports to the 
North American market.27 Fiat only had a small share of the American market. In 1966, 
a total of 10 000 cars were exported to the US. In addition it exported about the same 
number of cars and tractors to the Australian markets. In the late 1960s the company 
sought further expansion in overseas markets, of which the American was among the 
most important.  To achieve this end a series of complicated transport challenges had to 
be overcome.  
Traditionally, conventional liners had shipped the limited export of Fiat cars and 
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tractors. As the company sought to expand its sales overseas, other transport solutions 
had to be envisaged. In the autumn of 1968, therefore, negotiations started with the 
Norwegian shipowner Andreas Ugland.28 The shipping company Ugland had been 
established in the small town of Grimstad in southern Norway in 1930.  By the mid-
1960s, the company, now governed by the two sons of the initial founder, had 
developed to become Norway’s third largest operator of bulk carriers and the largest in 
the ore trade.29 More or less accidentally, the company gradually became involved in 
car transport through time charter arrangements with the Swedish company Wallenius. 
Conventional bulk carriers were rebuilt to handle a combined cargo of heavy bulk 
products, containers and cars that were typically shipped from Europe (pig iron and 
cars) to the US east coast and further to Japan before returning (with Japanese cars) to 
Europe. This new car carrying business was organised and operated more or less 
exclusively by one of the Ugland sons, Andreas, who had been educated as a naval 
engineer with a special interest in efficient ship design. After having operated the 
combined car and bulk/carriers for some time he gradually came to the conclusion that 
the scope for improvements in both cargo handling and efficiency was substantial. He 
also started contemplating the possibilities for building ships specifically designed to 
carry cars. As he wrote in a retrospective, personal memo, ‘the conclusions we soon 
drew was that ships transporting cars should be built specifically for this light cargo. 
Thereby we could build a hull that was much sharper, with less use of bunkers, better 
transport systems on-board and a better stability to transport cars than what was the case 
with bulk carriers.’30 
As a consequence of these considerations, Andreas Ugland established a 
separate company to explore more fully the opportunities in the car trade. In July 1968 
an order was placed at the German yard AG Blom and Voss for the building of three so-
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called pure car carriers (PCC). These were ships specifically designed to handle cars, or 
as formulated by the shipping consultants at Drewry: ‘a fixed deck car transporter 
designed solely for the carrying of passenger cars’.31  
When the ships were ordered, Ugland had no occupation for them. Demand for 
overseas car transport was increasing steadily, but no exporter had seen the possibilities 
in specialised car carriers. Hence, parallel to building the ships Ugland started issuing 
letters to many of the largest car exporters in Europe offering the services of the new 
ships. One of the companies that responded was Fiat, and already by  September 1968 
meetings were held between Andreas Ugland and Cecare Manera and Franco Maspoli 
from Fiat. Two months later the two companies signed a three year contract whereby 
Ugland was to take full responsibility for Fiat’s car exports to the US and Australia. 
 Before the export could get going, however, a number of different problems had 
to be solved. The first was related to the construction of the ships that had been ordered. 
Ocean-going PCCs of the size Ugland wanted to build was unprecedented and many of 
the technical solutions had to be developed from scratch.32 Ugland and some of his 
naval engineers worked closely together with the yard to construct a ship that could 
operate efficiently and at the same time decrease the amount of damage made to the 
cars. Two and a half years were spent before the first ship – Laurita – was finally 
launched and handed over to Ugland.  
To make sure that the expansion of the Fiat exports could proceed smoothly, a 
suitable ship was only one part of the solution. An appropriate harbour for the loading 
of the cars also had to be found, requiring lengthy negotiations between Ugland, Fiat 
and a number of Italian ports. After some time, the decision was finally set on the port 
of Savona. Subsequently, a deal had to be made between Ugland and the company 
responsible for landward transportation of Fiat cars to the port. In the case of Savona, 
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Fiat used the Italian agent Züst Ambrosetti, so Ugland and Ambrosetti had to negotiate 
a deal capable of securing a coordinated delivery of cars to the harbour. In securing this, 
the two companies ended up co-operating on the establishment of a specially designed, 
twelve story car-parking house situated in the harbour. The major objective was to 
further increase the speed with which the ships could be loaded, to reduce the number of 
damages and also minimise the possibilities for theft. Finally, on the other side of the 
Atlantic, negotiations had to be made between Ugland, the American importer of Fiats - 
the company Fiat Roosevelt - and various ports on the US West and East coast, to find 
the most suitable harbours for the delivery of the cars. Ugland himself visited a series of 
ports on both coasts, and in concert with the leading management of the importing 
company decided on the central ports of call.  
When the first shipload of Fiats departed from Savona in January 1970, trade in 
Italian cars was taken to a new level. During the 1970s Italian car exports continued to 
rise, and in contrast to major car exporters such as the British and the Germans, who 
increasingly were outperformed by a surging Japanese car industry, the Italians largely 
managed to retain their relative market position. While the total number of Italian cars 
exported continued to rise, German and British exports declined also in absolute terms. 
By 1975 the number of German cars being exported was just slightly larger than it had 
been ten years earlier, while the number of Italian cars being exported was twice as 
large.33  
The deals made between Ugland, Fiat and the other partners involved in 
organizing the Fiat shipments certainly do not by themselves explain the positive Italian 
experience.  German, British and Swedish exporters also increasingly started using 
specialised PCCs to carry their cars. In fact, already by 1977 the car carrying capacity of 
the world’s PCC fleet had passed the capacity of the traditional car/bulk carriers.34 But 
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the application of new and more efficient car carrying technology, alongside the 
improvements in onshore cargo handling, were important and necessary preconditions 
for the development taking place. The case illustrates how a rather small shipping firm 
was able to play a vital role in solving the technological and organisational problems 
involved. It did so by developing and introducing new and innovative ship technology, 
organising the rebuilding of existing harbour facilities, building networks with 
producers and sellers of cars as well as with handling agents and landward 
transportation companies. This clearly demonstrates the importance of firms in 
understanding the inner workings of the globalisation process. Specifically it shows 
how trade growth and globalisation intimately relied on the construction of complex 
transnational networks of economic agents that all played an active role in the 
development that took place.  
International trade in cars and heavy machinery experienced a spectacular 
growth during the second half of the twentieth century. One of the few products that 
grew at a similar pace was chemicals. In 1955, world trade in chemical products was 
rather limited. In value terms the trade amounted to less than five billion dollars, or just 
above five per cent of the total value of world merchandise exports. Forty years later the 
value of the trade had reached 467 billion dollars, and its’ share of total merchandise 
exports had reached almost ten per cent. As a consequence, chemicals had become the 
third most traded product in the world in value terms.35  
Trade in chemicals included a variety of products, including organic products 
such as ethylene, propylene, butadiene (the olefins), benzene, toluene and xylene (the 
aromatics), inorganic products such as phosphoric acid and caustic soda, vegetable oils 
and molasses.36  A growing use of plastics, the expansion of the aluminium and 
fertilizer industries and a growing market for vegetable oils and molasses all contributed 
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to the growth of international trade in these products. In fact, many of the products that 
now entered the international market had never been traded overseas before. One reason 
was simply that many of them were new. Another reason was that they were difficult to 
transport efficiently across long distances. The volumes traded were often small and the 
different products needed to be transported in segregated tanks. Efficient bulk carrying 
of such products thus required the development of ships capable of transporting a 
variety of products in separated tanks without any risk of contamination or spills. Many 
of the chemicals now entering the international market were also toxic, they could 
explode as well as pollute and taint both crew and marine life. In addition some 
products, such as phosphoric and sulphuric acid and caustic soda, are corrosive to 
metals. Seaborne trade in these products thus required the construction of sophisticated 
tanks that were either coated with rubber or acid proof paints, or even better, made of 
stainless steel. In other words, for the trade in chemicals to get going a series of 
complex challenges relating to the efficient and safe overseas transport of these products 
had to be overcome. By the beginning of the 1950s very few of these problems had been 
solved and trade was miniscule. Forty years later chemicals had become among the 
largest products in world trade.  
To explain this development, reference to changes in the transportation or other 
trade costs is obviously not sufficient. Rather, to understand how the massive growth in 
chemical trade was possible we need to explore the technological, institutional and 
organisational innovations preceding the growth and how these established the 
preconditions for an increasingly large international market for chemical products. 
These innovations and entrepreneurial activities were largely handled by a small 
number of shipping companies dedicated to exploring the commercial opportunities in 
increased overseas transport of chemicals. One of the main participants in this 
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development was the medium sized Norwegian company Odfjell.37 By the mid-1950s 
the firm, established in 1915 and based in the town of Bergen on the west coast, 
operated a fleet consisting primarily of general cargo carriers, as well as some 
specialised product tankers. During the next decade, however, Odfjell took a leading 
role in the development of the international chemical trade and grew to become one of 
the leading shipping firms within it.  
As already indicated, the growth of the international chemical trade relied on the 
development of ships that were capable of transporting a variety of products in 
separated tanks without any risk of contamination or spills. So-called parcel tankers had 
been developed to this end, capable of carrying a large variety of chemicals in bulk. 
Once the first of such ships had been launched in the late 1940s – pioneered largely by 
giant US chemical companies such as Union Carbide – they soon became what Murphy 
and Tenold have described as ‘the favoured vessel for the carriage of a wide range of 
chemicals’. The obvious reason was that ‘this kind of transport gave substantial cost 
reductions relative to shipments in individual containers on conventional ships.’38 Put 
differently, the price of chemical transport decreased and therefore stimulated trade.  
Price reductions made possible by technological improvement were, however, 
not the only trade stimulating effect of the parcel tanker. Increasing technological 
sophistication in the construction of these ships throughout the 1960s and 1970s meant 
that products which had been excluded from intercontinental trade for safety or other 
reasons now became tradable. By that stage, the technological development processes 
were largely in the hands of a few shipping companies. When Odfjell entered the 
chemical trade, the main target was to develop ships that could secure efficient and safe 
transport solutions for the widest possible range of products. Under slogans such as ‘for 
anything liquid’, Odfjell sought solutions that would maximise the flexibility of their 
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ships by making them able to carry everything from the most difficult chemicals, such 
as sulphuric and phosphoric acid, to ‘wine, milk and honey if that was available.’39 This 
strategy required innovative thinking in terms of ship design, and in 1959 the company 
ordered the first chemical tanker built from scratch with stainless steel tanks. Only a 
year later, two more ships of the same type were contracted for. As in the case of 
Ugland´s first pure car carriers, the ordering of these stainless steel ships resulted 
primarily from the technological curiosity and inventiveness of the shipowner family. 
There was no prior demand for stainless steel ships. In fact, neither fellow shipowners 
nor the chemical producers saw the economic potential in these vessels. As J. O. Odfjell 
later recalled:  
I had the idea of building a vessel with stainless steel tanks. Everybody I talked to found this 
idea absurd. The vessel would be too expensive to give any returns. No yard had the necessary 
experience […] I also discussed the matter with several chemical companies. They thought 
the idea was utopian.40  
The company still went ahead and soon found that these ships had several advantages. 
Firstly, the types of cargoes that could be safely transported increased considerably. 
Secondly, since the stainless steel tanks were much easier to clean than conventional 
tanks, the time spent in the port was reduced and utilisation rates increased. Hence, the 
cost of carrying less sophisticated and more conventional chemicals was further 
reduced.  
It was not only through technological innovations that maritime business firms 
like Odfjell advanced the growth of the chemical trade.  The company also contributed 
to reorganising the trade by the development of specialised, in-house brokering 
competence. This tied the producers and users of chemical products closer together and 
further increased the efficiency and reliability with which the trade could be handled. 
Finally, Odfjell and other shipping companies played a key role in developing land-
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based facilities that further increased both the profitability and safety of chemical 
transport, in the same manner as in the transport of cars. As the trade grew, storage 
capacity for chemical products became ‘a bottleneck in the distribution’ according to the 
Odfjell owners.41 Increasingly, therefore, the efficient operation of overseas chemical 
transport required the development of specially designed port terminals capable of 
storing and redistributing potentially dangerous chemical cargoes. Logistical problems 
were particularly pertinent in ports along the South American and African coast, but in 
European and North American ports there was also an urgent need for efficient and safe 
terminals. To alleviate the problems and further increase the efficiency of the shipping 
operations Odfjell decided to invest heavily in the construction of onshore terminal 
facilities in selected ports. The first terminal was opened in Buenos Aires in 1969. Later 
terminals were established and operated, either from scratch or through various forms of 
partnership in Marseilles, Valleyfield (near Montreal), Hamburg and Santos.  
Without innovations such as the parcel tanker, the stainless steel tanks, 
specialised brokering as well as onshore facilities in the form of terminals, the booming 
trade in dangerous chemical substances experienced during the second half of the 
twentieth century would have developed much more slowly, or perhaps not at all. These 
innovations both made overseas transport of chemicals more cost efficient, and enabled 
trade in substances that would otherwise have been debarred from international trade. 
Shipping companies played a vital role in these innovative processes, putting in place 
the preconditions for increased international trade and ultimately for the globalisation of 
the market for chemical products. As Murphy and Tenold conclude in their study of the 
growth of the international chemical trade: ‘The technological innovations and transport 
cost reductions associated with parcel tankers are important explanations for the growth 
of the international trade in chemicals.’42  
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‘Real world’ economic globalisation 
Writing on the relationship between business history and economic history in a 1966 
issue of the Journal of Economic History, Harold F. Williamson complained that the 
two strands of research had drifted too far apart. This separation, he argued, had 
effected negatively both the work of business historians and of economic historians. 
One of the major problems noted was how a lack of interest in the operations of firms 
had caused economic history to loose sight of the ‘real’ economy and instead drift into 
abstractions. To alleviate this situation, a new dialogue between the two fields was 
called for. As he wrote in his concluding remarks: ‘Economic historians [...] must 
almost of necessity draw on the work of business historians if they are to bridge the gap 
between theoretical abstractions and the real world’.43 
In this article we have discussed the continued absence of a business historical 
perspective from major debates within economic history, economics and other social 
sciences. Specifically, we have focused on the issue of modern economic globalisation, 
and how the burgeoning field of research on this topic has largely failed to include the 
role and importance of firms and entrepreneurs in their analysis. We have argued why 
this is problematic and also suggested some possible steps that could help improve the 
situation.  
The process of world economic integration is, we believe, too important and too 
complex to be left to economists and macroeconomic historians alone. To understand 
the inner workings of the globalisation process more micro oriented studies are 
necessary and business historians are uniquely placed to provide new insights in this 
field. We certainly do not think that a merger of business history and maritime history, 
as suggested in this article, will be sufficient to fill the gap. What we firmly believe, 
however, is that a business historical perspective is badly needed in the ongoing debates 
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on the origins, causes, extent and effects of globalisation. Business historians could 
provide flesh and bones to the important, yet often static and too simplified, explanatory 
models dominating the present research agenda, thereby bringing the study of 
globalisation nearer to ‘the real world’.  
To achieve this important end, business historians have to engage more eagerly 
in research addressing larger economic processes and be more willing to shuttle 
between various levels of abstraction. The detailed studies of business firms and 
industries have to be integrated with broader reflections of macro economic processes, 
and globalisation is one such important processes. Business histories of maritime firms 
and industries are eminently suited to achieve such an ambition. The cases presented in 
this article are only brief sketches of very sophisticated business processes.  All the 
same they support the fundamental point made in favour of our emerging discipline by 
T.S Ashton in his editorial to the very first issue of Business History. His formula, 
explaining the need for a business history approach to comprehensive economic issues 
like globalisation, still seems valid:  ‘For it is in the individual firm, rather than in wider 
organisations, that we can observe the operation of economic forces at first hand.’44
                                                 
1  Jones and Zeitlin, “Introduction”, 1. 
2  A typical example is Mathias Kipping and Behlül Üsdiken’s chapter on business history 
and management studies, where they noticed how ‘the study of management and 
organisation has in rather abrupt fashion turned away from history.’ Kipping and Üsdiken, 
“Business history and Management”, 99.  
3  Jones and Khanna, “Bringing History (Back)”, 453-4.  
4  Friedman and Jones, “Business History”, 3. 
5  Ibid., 5 (my italics).  
6  Hannah, “New Issues”, 166.  
7  As noted by Jan Art Scholte: ‘Since the 1990s globalisation has become a major academic 
25 
 
                                                                                                                                               
growth industry’. Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction, 51  
8  Bordo, Eichengreen and Irwin, “Is Globalization Today Different?” For the first debate 
see e.g. O´Rourke and Williamson, “Once More”; O´Rourke and Williamson, “Did Vasco 
da Gama Matter?”; O´Rourke and Williamson, Globalization and History; O´Rourke and 
Williamson, “When did Globalization begin?”; Rönnbäck, “Integration of Global 
Commodity Markets”; Frank, ReOrient; Wallerstein, Capitalist Agriculture; Wallerstein, 
The Second Era;  Hopkins, Globalization in World History; Bayly, The Birth; Stearns, 
Globalization in World History. For the second debate, the classic contribution is Hirst and 
Thompson, Globalization in Question. See also Bordo, Eichengreen and Irwin, “Is 
Globalization Today Different?”; O´Rourke; “Europe and Globalization”; Baldwin and 
Martin, “Two Waves of Globalization”; Temin, “Globalization”;  Sachs and Warner, 
“Economic Reform”. A good historiography on globalization and history in general is 
provided by Lang, “Globalization and its History”.  
9  See e.g James, Creation and Destruction; James, The End of Globalization.  
10  Indeed, much of the work cited above has been written by academics who would consider 
themselves economic historians. But the large majority of them have their degrees in 
economics; they work in economics departments and have their professional position in 
economics.  Some of them also explicitly define themselves within a specific strand of 
economic history labelled the new comparative economic history that explicitly ‘is 
motivated by current debates among academic economists and policymakers rather than 
following agendas set by historians’. Taylor, O´Rourke and Hatton, New Comparative 
Economic History, 2.  
11  See Jones, “Globalization”; Jones and Wadhwani, “Entrepenurial Theory”.  
12  Findlay and O´Rourke, Power and Plenty, 501-2.  
13  Bordo, Taylor and Williamson, “Introduction”, 3. 
14  Jones, “Globalization”, 142.  
15  Ibid., 162.  
16  Harlaftis, “Maritime History”, 220.  
17  IMO, “Shipping Facts and Figures”, 7. 
18  Hannah, “New Issues”, 166-7. 
19  See e.g Hummels, “Transportation Costs”  
26 
 
                                                                                                                                               
20  For a more elaborate discussion of these issues see Ekberg, Lange and Merok, ”Building 
networks of Trade”.  
21  Estimates are from Harlaftis, Greek-Owned Shipping, 250-2. 
22  Lorange, Shipping Strategy, 82.  
23  The second largest was Office and telecom equipment. All figures from GATT, cited in 
Grimwade, International Trade, 14. 
24  Figures from Drewry, Car-bulk Carriers; Drewry, Car carriers.  
25  Findlay and O´Rourke, Power and Plenty . 
26  A good overview is Vickery “Globalization in Automobile Industry”.  
27  Steimler and Stavseth, Car Transport by Sea, 13. 
28  The following is largely based on Ekberg, “The Deep-Sea Car-Carrying Industry”; 
Nerheim and Gjerde, Uglandrederiene.  
29  Since Norway at this point operated one of the world’s largest fleets of dry bulk carriers 
this implied that Ugland was in fact one of the world’s largest operators of such ships, see 
Fon, En stormakt i tørrbulk.  
30  Cited in Ekberg, “The Deep-Sea Car-Carrying Industry”, 266. 
31  Drewry. Growth of Car-Carrying Fleet, 10. 
32  It needs to be recognised that the idea of constructuing Pure Car Carriers was not 
completely new. Already in 1965 the shipowner Jan Erik Dyvi – also a Norwegian – had 
launched what is commonly regarded the world´s first PCC, Dyvi Anglia. This ship was, 
however, rather small and operated exclusively in the short-sea market. By 1968 Dyvi had, 
however,  launched  another two ships both of which eventually entered the deep-sea 
service, carrying Volkswagen cars across the North Atlantic. The three ships launced by 
Ugland in the early 1970s wer, however, ‘Larger and faster [..] than anything yet build’. 
Drewry. Growth of Car-Carrying Fleet, 13. See also Bakka, Livsseilas.  
33  Figures compiled from Drewry, Growth of Car-Carrying Fleet, Drewry, Car-bulk 
Carriers. 
34  Ekberg, “The Deep-Sea Car-Carrying Industry”, 256.  
35  Figures from GATT, cited in Grimwade, International Trade, 14.  
36  Stopford, Maritime Economics, 473-5.  
27 
 
                                                                                                                                               
37  Subsequent information on the development of the Odfjell company is largely based on 
Thowsen and Tenold, Oddfjell; Tenold, “Steaming Ahead”; Murphy and Tenold, 
“Strategies, market concentration and hegemony”.  
38  Murphy and Tenold, “Strategies, market concentration and hegemony”, 294. 
39  Quote from J.O Odfjell, cited in Towsen and Tenold, Oddfjell, 307-8. 
40  Cited in Ibid., 308.  
41  Ibid., 358. 
42  Murphy and Tenold, “Strategies, market concentration and hegemony”, 306.  
43  Williamson, “Business History and Economic History”, 417.  







Ashton, T. S. "Business History." Business History 1, no. 1 (1958): 1-2. 
Bakka, Dag. Livsseilas i umerket farvann: Dyvi a/S : Hovedtrekk i rederiets historie.  
Oslo: Dyvi AS, 2007. 
Baldwin, Richard E., and Philippe Martin. "Two Waves of Globalization: Superficial 
Similarities, Fundamental Differences." National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper Series No. 6904 (1999). 
Bayly, C. A. The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and 
Comparisons.  Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Pub., 2004. 
Bordo, Michael D., Barry Eichengreen, and Douglas A.  Irwin. "Is Globalization Today 
Really Different Than Globalization a Hundred Years Ago?" In NBER Working 
Paper. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1999. 
Bordo, Michael D., Alan M. Taylor, and Jeffrey G. Williamson. "Introduction." In 
Globalization in Historical Perspective. Chicago, Ill.: Chicago University Press, 
2005. 
Drewry. Car Carriers: The Fast Lane of International Shipping.  London: Drewry 
Shipping Consultants, 2006. 
———. Car-Bulk Carriers: Their Impact on the Freight Market.  London: Drewry 
Shipping Consultants 1971. 
———. The Growth of the Car-Carrying Fleet.  London: Drewry Shipping Consultants 
1977. 
Ekberg, Espen. "The Growth of the Deep-Sea Car-Carrying Industry, 1960-2008." In 
New Directions in Norwegian Maritime History edited by Lewis R Fischer and 
Even Lange. St. John's: International Maritime Economic History Association, 
2012: 253-79. 
Ekberg, Espen, Even Lange, and Eivind Merok. "Building the Networks of 
Trade:Perspectives on Twentieth Century Maritime History." In The World's 
Key Industry: History and Economics of International Shipping, edited by 
Gelina Harlaftis, Stig Tenold and Jesús M. Valdaliso. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2012: 88-105. 
Findlay, Ronald, and Kevin H. O'Rourke. Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the 
World Economy in the Second Millennium.  Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2007. 
Fon, Anders Martin. "En stormakt i tørrbulk: En økonomisk-historisk analyse av norsk 
tørrbulkfart 1950-1973" [“A superpower in dry bulk. An economic-historic 
analysis of Norwegian dry bulk shipping, 1950-1973”]. Norges 
Handelshøyskole, 1995. 
Frank, Andre Gunder. Reorient: Global Economy in the Asian Age.  Berkeley, Calif.: 
University of California Press, 1998. 
Friedman, Walter A., and Geoffrey Jones. "Business History: Time for Debate." 
Business History Review 85, no. 1 (2011): 1-8. 
Grimwade, Nigel. International Trade: New Patterns of Trade, Production and 
Investment. 2nd ed.  London: Routledge, 2000. 
Hannah, Leslie. "New Issues in British Business History." Business History Review 57, 
no. 2 (1983): 165-74. 
Harlaftis, Gelina. A History of Greek-Owned Shipping. The Making of and International 
Tramp Fleet, 1830 to the Present Day.  London: Routledge, 1996. 
29 
 
———. "Maritime History or the History of Thalassa." In The New Ways of History. 
Developments in Historiography, edited by Gelina Harlaftis, Nikos Karapidakis, 
Kostas Sbonias and Vaios Vaiopoulos. London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2010. 
Hirst, Paul Q., and Grahame Thompson. Globalization in Question: The International 
Economy and the Possibilities of Governance.  Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996. 
Hopkins, A. G. Globalization in World History: Edited by A.G. Hopkins.  New York: 
W.W. Norton, 2002. 
Hummels, David. "Transportation Costs and International Trade in the Second Era of 
Globalization." Journal of Economic Perspectives 21, no. 3 (Sum 2007): 131-54. 
IMO. "International Shipping Facts and Figures – Information Resources on Trade, 
Safety, Security, Environment." London, 2012. 
James, Harold. The Creation and Destruction of Value: The Globalization Cycle.  
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2009. 
———. The End of Globalization: Lessons from the Great Depression.  Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001. 
Jones, Geoffrey. "Globalization." In The Oxford Handbook of Business History, edited 
by Geoffrey Jones and Jonathan Zeitlin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
Jones, Geoffrey, and Tarun Khanna. "Bringing History (Back) into International 
Business." Journal of International Business Studies 37, no. 4 (2006): 453-68. 
Jones, Geoffrey, and R. Daniel Wadhwani. "Entrepenurial Theory and the History of 
Globalization." Business and Economic History On-Line 5 (2007). 
Jones, Geoffrey, and Jonathan Zeitlin. "Introduction." In The Oxford Handbook of 
Business History, edited by Geoffrey Jones and Jonathan Zeitlin. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007. 
Kipping, Mathias, and Behlül Üsdiken. "Business History and Management Studies." In 
The Oxford Handbook of Business History, edited by Geoffrey Jones and 
Jonathan Zeitlin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008:96-119. 
Lang, Michael. "Globalization and Its History." The Journal of Modern History 78, no. 
4 (2006): 899-931. 
Lorange, Peter. Shipping Strategy: Innovating for Success.  New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009. 
Murphy, H., and S. Tenold. "Strategies, Market Concentration and Hegemony in 
Chemical Parcel Tanker Shipping, 1960-1985." Business History 50, no. 3 
(2008): 291-309. 
Nerheim, Gunnar, and Kristin Øye Gjerde. Uglandrederiene: Verdensvirksomhet Med 
Lokale Røtter.  Grimstad: Andreas K.L. og Johan Jørgen Ugland, 1996. 
O' Rourke, Kevin H. , and Jeffrey G. Williamson. "Once More: When Did Globalization 
Begin?". European Review of Economic History 8, no. 01 (2004): 109-17. 
———. "When Did Globalization Begin?". European Review of Economic History 6, 
no. 01 (2002): 23-50. 
O'Rourke, Kevin H. . "Europe and the Causes of Globalization, 1790 to 2000." In 
Europe and Globalization, edited by Henryk Kierzkowski. Geneva: Palgrave 
Macmillian, 2002. 
O'Rourke, Kevin H., and Jeffrey G. Williamson. "Did Vasco Da Gama Matter for 
European Markets?" The Economic History Review 62, no. 3 (2009): 655-84. 
———. Globalization and History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic 
Economy.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999. 
Rönnbäck, Klas. "Integration of Global Commodity Markets in the Early Modern Era." 
European Review of Economic History 13, no. 01 (2009): 95-120. 
30 
 
Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Andrew Warner. "Economic Reform and the Process of Global 
Integration." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 26, no. 1995-1 (1995): 1-
118. 
Scholte, Jan Aart. Globalization: A Critical Introduction.  Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillian, 2005. 
Stearns, Peter N. Globalization in World History.  London: Routledge, 2010. 
Steimler, Svein-Gustav, and Sverre Stavseth. Car Transport by Sea.  Bergen: NHH. 
Institute of shipping reseach, 1970. 
Stopford, Martin. Maritime Economics.  London: Routledge, 2009. 
Taylor, Alan M., Kevin H. O'Rourke, and Timothy J. Hatton. The New Comparative 
Economic History: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey G. Williamson.  Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 2007. 
Temin, Peter. "Globalization." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 15, no. 4 (1999): 76-
89. 
Tenold, Stig. "Steaming Ahead with Stainless Steel: Odfjells's Entry and Expansion in 
the Chemical Tanker Market, 1960-1974." International Journal of Maritime 
History XVIII, no. 1 (june 2006 2006): 179-98. 
Thowsen, Atle, and Stig Tenold. Odfjell.  Bergen: Odfjell ASA, 2006. 
Vickery, Graham "Globalization in the Automobile Industry." Chapter 4 in 
Globalization of Industry. Overview and Sector Reports, edited by OECD. Paris: 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1996:153-205. 
Wallerstein, Immanuel. Capitalist Agriculture and the Origin of the European World-
Economy in the Sixteenth Century. The Modern World-System. Vol. 1, New 
York: Academic Press, 1974. 
———. The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730-
1840s. The Modern World-System. Vol. 3, New York: Academic Press, 1989. 
Williamson, Harold F. "Business History and Economic History." The Journal of 
Economic History XXVI, no. 4 (1966): 407-17. 
 
 
 
